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Fritz B. Burns Lecture, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
November 22,1996

EUTHANASIA, MORALITY, AND LAW
INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Solum*
I. INTRODUCTION: EUTHANASIA AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW
AND MORALITY'

A. Moral Questions, Legal Questions
The topic of the 1996 Burns Lecture was Euthanasia,Morality
and the Law. This topic raises a set of issues that have occupied the
national stage in recent years, in part because of the urgent debate

over the propriety of physician-assisted suicide that has been provoked by the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian.' Kevorkian's actions
have provoked a legal response, but the glare of publicity has also
touched off an intense moral debate about physician-assisted suicide
in particular and euthanasia in general. It is perhaps not surprising
that as Kevorkian's actions have required law enforcement to take a
stand on physician-assisted suicide, a constitutional debate over the
questions of individual liberty and state power has also come to a
* Professor Lawrence Solum is Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in
Los Angeles and former Associate Dean. He is a graduate of Harvard Law
School and is widely published in the field of jurisprudence.
1. The Fifth Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture was held on November 22, 1996,
at Loyola Law School. The participants were Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis.
The transcript reproduced here is based on Professor Dworkin's and Professor
Finnis's presentations but has been edited for clarity. The Introduction was written by Professor Solum and was not presented at the Lecture.-Eds.
2. See, e.g., James Ricci, Friends Say Ill Woman Chose Her 'Final Exit'
Death. The Body of Elaine Day, a 79-Year-Old Victim of ALS, Was Found in
Dr.Jack Kevorkian's Van, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B7; Kevorkian Is Investigated in 2 New Michigan Deaths, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at A14; New ProsecutorDrops ChargesAgainst Kevorkian,L.A. TMMs, Jan. 11, 1997, at A14.
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head. In January of 1996, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral argument on the constitutional dimensions of t~ie issue in two
cases, Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg. The constitutional issues raised in these cases have already received scholarly attention, and more is sure to follow a decision on the merits.
The topic of euthanasia calls into question the proper relationship between morality and law. In this introduction, I shall focus our
attention on two questions, the question of morality and the question
of law. Consider first the question of morality. Citizens in a democratic society face a moral question, whether assisted suicide or
euthanasia is ever the best choice-the choice that virtue requires.
Each of us approaches this moral question from our own standpoint,
from the moral and religious traditions in which we participate. And
the question has different answers. Some of us believe strongly in the
sanctity of human life, and oppose the deliberate taking of life by assisted suicide. Others believe in a moral responsibility to end unnecessary suffering or a strong right to self-determination on issues of
life and death, affirming that in some circumstances, assistance in the
ending of life is morally required.
In addition to this moral question, we must face another question, the question as to how laws should treat euthanasia and assisted
suicide. In the cases heard by the Supreme Court in January 1997,
the legal question was whether a state can prohibit physician-assisted
suicide without violating a fundamental right protected by the United
States Constitution. But this specific question points to a larger
question of political morality. Given the fact of moral and religious
pluralism, how should the law treat issues on which there is fundamental moral disagreement at the very deepest level?
In this Introduction, I shall not attempt to answer these questions; rather, I shall call our attention to some of the considerations
that may bear on our deliberations. My aim is to point to considerations that might be neglected given the intensity of the debate and
the real importance of concerns about suffering, self-determination,
and the sanctity of life.

3. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), modified sub noma.

Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36

(1996).
4. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.

1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd en banc, 79 F.3d 790, cert. granted,

117 S.Ct. 37 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123 (1997).
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B. Virtue at the End of Life
Consider first the moral dimension of euthanasia. Each of us
may be faced with the question whether our own life should be prolonged artificially, whether our pain should be eased when that may
entail that our life is shortened, or even whether we might seek assistance in ending our life, when its continuation would mean great pain
or indignity without hope of eventual recovery. We may face these
same questions with respect to our parents, our spouses, or even our
children.
What resources of mind and spirit could help us to face such
wrenching questions of life and death? One would hope, of course,
to face such ultimate choices with one's values and faculties intact.
That is, one would hope for the resources of intellect and spirit that
would enable one to see clearly and choose wisely. And if one faced
the end of life with a failing body and impaired faculties, one would
hope that friends or family and care-givers would bring compassion
and insight to any decision that would need to be made on one's behalf. In other words, the sort of resource that can aid in making the
most difficult decisions at the end of life are resources of characterin particular, the moral and intellectual resources that we call the
"virtues."
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in Aristotelian moral theory and especially in Aristotle's theory of the virtues.
For Aristotle, the virtues are acquired dispositional qualities; they
are potentialities or powers which are states of character or of mind.
Aristotle characterizes the virtues as intellectual or moral, and his
views can be sketched by examining these two categories.
The moral virtues are states of character concerned
S•
10with choice;
examples include courage, temperance, and justice.
Aristotle
thought that each of the moral virtues could be seen as the mean between two opposing vices: thus, courage is a mean between the vices
6. See, e.g., PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICEs (1978); PETER GEACH,
THE VIRTUES (1978); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
This development is in part traceable to Elizabeth Anscombe's essay, Modern
Moral Philosophy. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy in JuDrTH J.
THOMPSON & GERALD DWORKiN, ETHICs (1968).
7. See W. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 107-08 (2d ed. 1980).

& See id. at 99.
9. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 1103 a6-10 (J.O. Urmson ed. &

W.D. Ross trans.) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKs OF ARISTOTLE 1742 (Jonathan
Barnes ed. 1984) [hereinafter Nicomachean Ethics].

10. See HARDIE, supranote 7, at 116.
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of timidity and recklessness. Moral virtues, says Aristotle, are acquired as a result 19f habit; one must act courageously in order to become courageous.
The intellectual virtues are practical and theoretical wisdom.
Practical wisdom or phronesis is excellence in deliberation: the man
of practical reason § able to choose good ends and the means to
achieve those ends.
Practical wisdom operates in the realm of
praxis: action in particular situations. Theoretical wisdom or sophia,

on the other hand, operates in the realm of theoria: abstract thinking,
science, and theory. The intellectual virtuss are initially developed
by teaching and mature through experience.
My suggestion is that when we think about the decisions that
may be faced at the end of life, we ought to reflect on the resources
that virtue can provide in making these decisions. We hope to face
these decisions with the moral virtues of integrity, courage, and compassion. Crucially, I believe, we want to make a decision that is sensitive to the particular situation-to concrete individuals who are affected by the choice, to the medical condition of the patient, and to
the values that gave meaning to the life that person lived. We hope
to be able to see clearly, to perceive the morally salient features of
the choice that must be made. Decisions about the end of life should
be guided by our values and our ideals, but neither abstract moral
principles nor a calculation of utilities is a sufficient basis for navigating the poorly charted waters of the end of life. Wisdom, common
11. See Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 9, at 1115 a6-7; HARDIE, supra note
7, at 118.
12. See NicomacheanEthics, supra note 9, at 1103 a14; HARDIE, supranote 7,
at 99-100.
13. See Nicomachean Ethics,supra note 9, at 1140 a25-28.
14. See HARDIE, supra note 7, at 336-57.
15. See Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 9, at 1103 a14; HARDIE, supra note 7,
at 99-100.
16. Some of the writing on the topic of euthanasia does refer to virtue ethics.
For example, Charles Dougherty has written:
Virtue or moral excellence lies between excess and deficiency; extremes
should be avoided. But there is one expense in our health care system
that has been decried by ethicists and social critics throughout the late
twentieth century, namely, fixation on cure to the detriment of care.
Euthanasia is the apotheosis of this tendency. Instead of enhancing care
for the dying patient, the condition is cured by killing the patient. Legalization will exacerbate this excess and move the health care system
further away from balance and moral excellence.
Charles J. Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness, and Euthanasia,9
IssuEs L. & MED. 151, 161 (1993). Dougherty's brief discussion does not offer a

full or balanced account of the implications of the virtues for decisions at the end
of life.
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sense, clarity of vision, courage, compassion, and integrity-these are
the virtuesto which we should aspire in making decisions about the
end of life.
C. Public Reason and the ConstitutionalDebate

The relationship between euthanasia and morality comes to the
fore in the most private of contexts, the conversations between patient, family, and physician provoked by the imminent end of life. By
way of contrast, the relationship between euthanasiaand law is necessarily a public matter, requiring our articulation of public reasons for
the legislative and judicial choices we believe should be made concerning the legal status of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
What I should like to suggest is that our discussion of the legal dimension should be guided by an ideal of public reason that reflects
the political virtue of civility.
Civility and public reason are particularly important in a society
like ours, which is characterized by the fact of pluralism. Citizens in
modem democratic societies affirm a variety of moral and religious
doctrines. Our religious beliefs include Islam, Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and these religious doctrines share the stage
with a variety of secular beliefs about what constitutes the good and
what is ultimately meaningful in life. Our historical experience suggests that the fact of pluralism is likely, for the foreseeable future, to
be an unchanging feature of modem social life. We are unlikely to
agree on a single religion or a single philosophy, at least so long as we
live in a free society.
What is an appropriate ideal of public reason for a pluralist society like ours? The notion that our discussion of important public
matters, such as our essential constitutional liberties, should be constrained by an ideal of public reason has recently been articulated by
John Rawls. Rawls contends that the public reason of a political society is its "way of formulating its plans, of putting its eqds in an order of priority and of making its decisions accordingly." Thus, public reason contrasts with the "nonpublic reasons of churches and of
17. I am greatly indebted to Philippa Foot for her work, which lays the foundations of the perspective that I offer here. See PHILIPPA FOOT, Euthanasia,in
VIRTUES AND VIcEs 33 (1978).
18. JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212 (paper ed. 1996); Lawrence B.
Solurn, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1453 (1996); Lawrence B.
Solurn, Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructingan Ideal of PublicReason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1993).
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many other associations in civil society." Public and nonpublic reason share simple rules of-inference and evidence-these features are
essential to reason itself. But public reasons are limited to premises
and modes of reasoning that can be viewed as reasonable by reasonable citizens; the criterion for public reason is availability to the public at large. Rawls argues that these include, but are not necessarily
limited to, "presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning
found in common sense, and the methods of science when these are
not controversial."
Nonpublic reasons would include reasons located within the
deep premises of a comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical
moral theory. Consider two examples of nonpublic reasons: first, the
hedonistic utilitarian premise that only pleasures and pains are of
fundamental value, and second, a religious belief that a particular
text is sacred and that its authoritative interpretation by church leaders is the source of binding moral reasons. Although the utilitarian
premise is secular and the theological premise is religious, both are
nonpublic reasons because neither can be accepted as a reasonable
ground for action by the public at large-understood as the body of
citizens who are in full possession of the powers of human reason and
who nevertheless believe in a variety of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines.
Rawls argues that the duty of civility and hence his ideal of public reason applies to citizens and public officials when they engage in
political advocacy in a public forum; it also governs the decisions that
officials make and the votes that citizens cast in elections. The ideal
does not, however, apply to what Rawls calls the background culture;
the reason of ciyil society includes discussion within a variety of special institutions, such as universities and churches, as well as dialogue
between the adherents of a variety of comprehensive religious and
secular doctrines. Moreover, the ideal does not apply to personal reflection and deliberation about political questions. It does not apply
to such reflection or deliberation about questions that are not political in nature. Finally, Rawls believes that the most appropriate
ideal of public reason for a modern democratic society is an inclusive
or wide, as opposed to exclusive or narrow, interpretation of the ideal
of public reason. Citizens and public officials do not breach the duty
19. RAWLS, supranote 18, at 213.
20. See'id at 220.
21. Id. at 224.

22. See id
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of civility when they offer nonpublic reasons as the foundations foror supplements to-public ones.
Why should we adhere to an ideal of public reason when we
consider the legal questions raised by euthanasia and in particular the
questions whether the constitution protects a right to refuse medical
treatment or to physician-assisted suicide? Rawls's justification for
his ideal of public reason is based on the liberal principle of legitimacy: "our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in
light of pinciples and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational." It is because of this principle that "the ideal of citizenship
imposes ... the duty of civility-to be able to explain to one another

on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they
advocate and yote for can be supported by the political values of
public reason."
What are the implications of public reason for the legal debate
over the issue of euthanasia? My aim in addressing this question is
not to argue for any particular resolution of the constitutional issues
that the Supreme Court faces this term. Rather, I should like to suggest that whatever our views, that the public debate over these issues
be conducted in accord with the political virtue of civility and that
our positions should be expressed in a manner that is accessible to
our fellow citizens.
When the stakes are life and death, there is a special temptation
to escalate the public debate to ultimate questions of good and evil.
On the one hand, some of us worry that the deliberate and intentional ending of a human life violates one of the most fundamental
moral and legal principles, the prohibition of murder. On the other
hand, others among us believe strongly that interference with selfdetermination at the end of life would violate a fundamental human
right to control one's own destiny.
Partisans on either side of this debate may succumb to the strong
temptation to escalate public political debate over euthanasia into a
fundamental debate over ultimate questions and to set aside the virtue of civility so that the passion of ultimate conviction may have its
say. We may be tempted to question motives and speculate on hidden agendas. In a society that protects the freedom of speech and
23. Id. at 217.
24. Id-
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conscience, the quality of public deliberation depends in large part on
the self-restraint and hence on the virtue of the citizenry at large.
But there is another way of proceeding. When we debate the legal issues raised by euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, we can
search for common ground, rather than focus on the questions that
divide us. This is not to say that we can or should disregard our most
fundamental beliefs about ultimate matters when we debate euthanasia in public. It is to say that we should search for the ways in
which our deepest beliefs converge and overlap with those of our
fellow citizens. The values that are brought to bear on the legal issues surrounding euthanasia are not necessarily ones that divide us.
The belief in the sanctity of human life, the belief that suffering
should be alleviated, and the belief that human dignity requires freedom and self-determination-these are values that are widely shared,
although the proper balance between them may be a subject of sharp
disagreement. A patient and respectful search for agreement using
the common resources of our shared public reason may repay us with
understanding and reconciliation, even if it does not repay us in the
dearer coin of a consensus on what the law ought to be.
As I say, the stakes involved in the debate over euthanasia, morality, and law are high and so the temptations are strong. But the
point of the virtue of civility is to enable us to overcome passions of
anger and indignation, so that we can treat our fellow citizens with
the respect they deserve. Our common public reason and our shared
political values may yet allow us to reach a measure of agreement.
We may yet resolve the debates over euthanasia, morality, and law in
a way that each of us can affirm as legitimate, even though many of
us would choose otherwise if the choice were ours alone.

